Regulation By Catastrophe Insurance: A Comparative Study by He, Qihao & Faure, Michael
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal School of Law 
2018 
Regulation By Catastrophe Insurance: A Comparative Study 
Qihao He 
Michael Faure 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cilj 
 Part of the Insurance Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
He, Qihao and Faure, Michael, "Regulation By Catastrophe Insurance: A Comparative Study" (2018). 
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal. 12. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cilj/12 
REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE INSURANCE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
QIHAO HE & MICHAEL FAURE ?
***
Under the influence of climate-related extremes, the world is exposed to 
more and more catastrophe risks. Increasingly it is held that the 
government alone may not be able to adequately prevent disaster risks; a 
combination of public and private regulation is therefore warranted. 
Regulation via insurance may help to realize the goal of disaster risk 
reduction and to mitigate the corresponding losses. In this article we
identify five regulatory tools — risk-based pricing, contract design, loss 
prevention services, claim management, and refusal to insure — that can be 
used by catastrophe insurers with the aim of disaster risk reduction. 
Subsequently, we explore how these tools are used in practice by insurers in 
five countries: United Kingdom, United States, France, Japan, and Turkey.
In doing so, we find that regulation through catastrophe insurance could 
have a positive effect on disaster risk reduction. However, the possibilities 
to regulate by insurance are in many countries de facto limited as a result of 
state intervention. Finally, we discuss the possibility and feasibility of 
regulation by catastrophe insurance in China, where it is not yet utilized.
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I. INTRODUCTION
According to Beck the current era is characterized as a “risk 
society”. 1 Under the influence of climate extremes and other natural 
disasters, the world is exposed to more and more catastrophe risks. 2
Although catastrophe risk events occur infrequently, such events result in
significant human and financial losses. There is increasing attention not 
only to the question of how to compensate victims, but also to how 
compensation mechanisms, including insurance, can stimulate disaster risk 
reduction.3
Increasingly insurance is seen as a tool to “outsource” public 
regulation.4 In order to remedy the risk of moral hazard, inherent in any 
insurance contract, insurers “regulate” how organizations and individuals 
should deal with specific risks.5 Private insurance can act not only as a form 
of post-disaster relief but also as a form of private regulation—a contractual 
                                                                                                                          
1 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, THEORY,
CULTURE & SOC’Y SERIES (1992).
2 Data from large reinsurers show that the amounts and damage 
resulting from both man-made and natural disasters have been increasing 
over the past 30 years. See Lucia Bevere, Kristen Orwig & Rajeev Sharan, 
Natural Catastrophes and Man-made Disasters in 2014: Convective and 
Winter Storms Generate Most Losses, SWISS RE INSTITUTION (2015),
http://www.actuarialpost.co.uk/downloads/cat_1/sigma2_2015_en.pdf; 
Munich Re, Topics GEO National catastrophes 2013 Analyses, 
assessments, positions (2014), http://www.munichre.com/site/corporate/ 
get/documents_E1043212252/mr/assetpool.shared/Documents/5_Touch/_
Publications/302-08121_en.pdf.
3 For example, The 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action highlights the 
urgency to advance the expansion of insurance markets to finance risk 
following a natural disaster. See J. David Cummins & Oliver Mahul,
Catastrophe Risk Financing in Developing Countries, THE WORLD BANK
(2009); In the EU the Green Paper on the insurance of natural and 
man-made disasters equally pays attention to the ability of insurance to 
provide compensation and to stimulate risk-mitigating behavior. See 
Enhance, Green Paper on The Insurance of Natural and Man-Made 
Disasters, (COM (2013) 213 final) (2013).
4 Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How 
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 200 (2012).
5 Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 
(1979).
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device controlling and motivating behavior prior to the occurrence of a
loss.6 Insurance is a well-known tool of risk management that addresses 
three aspects of risk management: risk assessment (or risk analysis), risk 
control, and risk financing.7 From society’s perspective, insurance has at 
least two important functions. The first is that it can spread risks over a 
larger community and thus compensate risk-averse individuals exposed to 
risky activities through risk pooling and risk shifting. A second function is 
that by controlling the moral hazard, risk insurers also regulate 
policyholders’ behavior and can thus contribute to risk reduction. Insurers 
can have these important functions also for catastrophe risks, provided 
specific conditions are met.8 The increasing amount of catastrophe losses is 
to a large extent due to an increasing contact between mankind and natural 
events. As a result of growing demographic pressures, there has been an 
increasing movement of population to high-risk areas, such as the coastal 
areas in Florida. This combined with aging infrastructure and low levels of 
public and private investment in disaster risk reduction increases the losses 
due to catastrophes. Insurance can, so we will argue, play an important role 
in preventing disaster losses and mitigating losses after a disaster has 
occurred. Given the increasing exposure of the population to catastrophe
losses, the importance of insurance as a tool to regulate risky behavior only 
increases.9 Once insurers underwrite catastrophe risk, they have every 
reason to try to reduce their payouts. Therefore, regulation by insurance 
may help realize the goal of disaster risk reduction and the corresponding 
losses.
                                                                                                                          
6 Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized 
Weather Insurance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2016).
7 J. FRANÇOIS OUTREVILLE, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE
45-64 (Kluwer Academic Publisher ed. 1998); ROB THOYTS, INSURANCE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 286-295 (Routledge ed., 2010); EMMETT J.
VAUGHAN & THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND 
INSURANCE 16 (Judith Joseph et al. eds., 10th ed. 2007).
8 George L. Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem of 
Catastrophic Loss, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219 (1996).
9 Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Have We Entered an Ever-Growing Cycle on 
Government Disaster Relief?, Presentation to U.S. Senate Committee on 
Small Business and Entrepreneurship (2013).
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Although there is general agreement on the important contribution 
of insurers to disaster risk reduction, less is known about the precise 
instruments and techniques used by insurers to achieve disaster risk 
reduction. This Article identifies under which specific conditions insurance 
can function as a substitute for, or a complement to, government regulation 
of catastrophe risks associated with natural disasters. This Article identifies 
five regulatory techniques of catastrophe insurance that may complement, 
and in some cases perhaps even outperform, government regulation by 
creating incentives for optimal behavior for individuals and organizations. 
The Article then compares five middle to high-income countries—the 
United Kingdom, the United States, France, Japan, and Turkey—in which 
catastrophe risks are regulated by insurance. In this comparison, we analyze 
the role of the state in facilitating regulation through insurance by 
examining to what extent the tools to control moral hazard are encouraged 
or restricted by government regulation. 
In Part II we review the literature describing how, specifically in 
the field of catastrophe insurance, insurers can exercise regulatory functions 
aiming at disaster risk reduction. In Part III we discuss five specific tools 
that can contribute to disaster risk reduction. Part IV provides examples of 
the use of those regulatory techniques in five different countries, both 
developed and developing. Part V provides a comparative discussion 
concerning the effectiveness of regulation via catastrophe insurance.
Finally, Part VI discusses the possibility and feasibility of regulation by 
catastrophe insurance in China, where it is not yet utilized.
II. INSURANCE AS A TOOL OF DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
Any insurance contract, whether it is first party (victim) insurance 
or third party (liability) insurance is vulnerable to the moral hazard risk. 
Many stress the fact that insurance leads to moral hazard. Therefore it is at 
first blush often considered as increasing risk, rather than as a tool of risk 
2018 REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE INSURANCE 193
reduction.10 Moral hazard is the tendency of insureds from vulnerable areas 
to exercise less care in avoiding losses than they would if the losses were 
not covered by insurers.11 Admittedly, it is only logical for the insureds to 
change their behavior as soon as the risk is fully removed from them.12
Such changes in behavior is in that sense not “immoral”. The moral hazard 
risk is especially problematic as far as liability insurance is concerned. The 
reason is that an exposure to liability provides incentives for the prevention 
of accidents to potential insurers. Moral hazard could endanger those 
incentives for prevention and may therefore have socially negative 
consequences. In that case liability insurance should be prohibited since it 
would increase risk in society.13 Remedies for moral hazard are available. 
The best option is monitoring by the insurer and a corresponding adaptation 
of premium conditions.14 This solution is thought to be the best since risk 
would be completely removed from a risk adverse individual. The 
second-best option is still to expose an insured partially to risk, either by 
applying deductibles or an upper limit on coverage.15 In practice, insurers 
will apply a combination of different techniques (risk differentiation, 
specific conditions in policies and deductibles) to control moral hazard.16 It 
is precisely through this control of the moral hazard risk that insurers will 
act as de facto regulators and invest in risk prevention. This article will 
                                                                                                                          
10 See Bengt Hölmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 Bell J. 
Econ. 74 (1979).
11 Kenneth S. Abraham & Daniel Schwarcz, INSURANCE LAW AND 
REGULATION, 7 (6th ed. 2015).
12 Mark Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AMER.
ECON. REV. 531(1968).
13 Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120, 
120-32 (1982).
14 This can take place ex ante (through a so-called risk classification) or
ex post (after the accident) through experience rating. The latter implies 
effectively that the premium would be increased after a reported incident.
15 Hsin-Chun Wang, Adaptation to Climate Change and Insurance 
Mechanism: A Feasible Proposal Based on a Catastrophe Insurance Model 
for Taiwan, 9 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 317 (2014).
16 See Shavell, supra note 5; Steven Shavell, On the Social Function 
and Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.
166, 168-70 (2000).
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show that through this control of the moral hazard, risk insurers are viewed 
as private (risk) regulators and that through this control of moral hazard 
they can contribute to disaster risk reduction.
A. INSURANCE AS PRIVATE (RISK) REGULATION
Regulation by insurance is not the same as insurance regulation. 
The latter is a classic topic of insurance law, and mainly discusses how the 
insurance business and organizations are regulated by administrative 
agencies. 17 On the other hand, regulation by insurance explores the 
potential value of insurance as a complement to, or substitute for, the 
State. 18 There is an increasing interest in the regulatory potential of 
insurance companies both in academic literature as well as at the policy 
level. 
A considerable amount of literature has been devoted to discussing 
regulation by insurance. As far back as 1986, Reichman explored insurance 
as a social control tool to regulate crime risk.19 More recently, Abraham 
offered an overview and critique of modern conceptions of insurance based 
on the debates about insurance and insurance law in recent decades; one
                                                                                                                          
17 There are many possible ways to describe insurance regulation. For 
example, the function of insurance regulation describes seven main 
functional divisions: licensing, taxation, solvency, rates, forms, access and 
availability, and market conduct; theoretical justifications of insurance 
regulation present information problems, externalities, opportunism and 
egalitarian or distributional objectives to justify regulation. See TOM 
BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW & POLICY: CASES 
MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 573–580 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013).
18 Some scholars prefer the term “governance by insurance.” In this 
Article, governance by insurance is interchangeable with the term 
“regulation by insurance.”
19 Nancy Reichman, Managing Crime Risks: Toward an Insurance 
Based Model of Social Control, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW, DEVIANCE AND 
SOCIAL CONTROL 151–172 (Andrew T. Scull & Stephen Spitzer eds., 
1986).
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such conception is that of “insurance as governance,” which corresponds to 
the idea of regulation by insurance.20
In 2002, Heimer discussed the cost and benefit of private regulation
through insurance. 21 In 2003, Ericson, Doyle, and Barry adopted a 
sociological perspective to explore insurance as governance, and 
documented how the insurance industry governs our lives and asserts 
insurance governing through nine interconnected dimensions.22 In 2004, 
Ericson and Doyle further applied their theoretical framework to four sets 
of risks that are governed by insurance: life, disability, earthquakes, and 
terrorism.23 They invented a new term for the insurance approach to natural 
catastrophe risk, “absorbing risk”, which requires creating an infrastructure 
that can withstand the shock of a catastrophe.24 Consistent with the concept 
of absorbing risk, Baker urged the reconsideration of assessment 
approaches to catastrophe insurance to allow insurance institutions to 
manage the uncertainties of catastrophe risk.25
In 2005, Baker and Farrish initiated the discussion of the technique 
of firearms regulation by liability insurance. 26 With gun violence 
                                                                                                                          
20 Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 653 (2013); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as 
Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 
(2009) (His argument seems to fit comfortably within the “insurance as 
governance” conception).
21 Carol Heimer, Insuring More, Ensuring Less: The Costs and Benefits 
of Private Regulation through Insurance, in EMBRACING RISK: THE 
CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 116-145 (Tom 
Baker & Jonathan Simon eds. 2002).
22 See generally RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE, & DEAN 
BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE (2003).
23 See generally RICHARD V. ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN 
BUSINESS: RISK, INSURANCE AND THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE (U. Toronto 
Press 2004).
24 Id.
25 See generally Tom Baker, Embracing Risk, Sharing Responsibility,
56 DRAKE L. REV. 561 (2007).
26 Tom Baker & Thomas O. Farrish, Liability Insurance & the 
Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE 
CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 292-314 (Timothy D. 
Lytton ed., 2005).
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dominating the headlines during the last several years, Kochenburger has
argued that regulation by liability insurance could serve as a potentially
valuable tool to address and reduce gun violence27 while Mocsary contends
that the insurance regime is unlikely to attain this goal.28 Besides gun
violence, Yin, Kunreuther, and White have examined how environmental
liability insurance can reduce environmental accidents based on
disaggregated (facility-level) data.29 Ben-Shahar and Logue have
additionally explored regulation by insurance as a substitute for
government regulation of safety in areas of products liability, workers’
compensation, auto, homeowners, environmental liability and tax liability,
and expand to yet unutilized areas, such as consumer protection, food
safety, and financial statements.30 In 2003, Baker and Swedloff
summarized regulation by liability insurance, and drew upon prior
literature to examine four areas of liability and corresponding insurance—
shareholder liability, automobile liability, gun liability, and medical
professional liability—and developed a conceptual framework to guide
qualitative research for lawyers’ professional liability.31
In 2015, Talesh significantly widened the scope of regulation by
insurance through the study of Employment Practices Liability Insurance
(“EPLI”), explaining how insurance practices have transformed the moral
logic of anti-discrimination law into the risk management logic of EPLI loss
prevention advice. This study demonstrated how regulation by insurance
does not simply consist of assessing how well liability insurance delivers a
legal deterrence signal, but rather how it transforms that signal into loss
27 Peter Kochenburger, Liability Insurance and Gun Violence, 46
CONN. L. REV. 1265, 1269-70 (2014).
28 George Mocsary, Insuring Against Guns?, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1209,
1212-13 (2014).
29Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther & Matthew W. White, Risk-Based
Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private Insurance Market
Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 325 (2011).
30 Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 4.
31 Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance:
From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412
(2013).
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prevention.32 It is not only insurers that play a role as private regulators; 
recently it was stressed that reinsurance companies can also act as “silent 
regulators”,33 particularly in exercising a regulatory influence on insurers.34
As we will show below, in the latter case there are often also hybrid 
constructions since catastrophe insurance is frequently offered by 
reinsurance pools in which the government equally participates. 
B. DISASTER RISK REDUCTION BY CONTROLLING MORAL HAZARD
These regulatory effects of insurance that have just been described 
generally can also be found in the area of catastrophe insurance. The danger 
of moral hazard can obviously also arise in the case of catastrophe 
insurance. As a result, insurers will exercise control on the behavior of the 
insured to remedy moral hazard. It is precisely that control that will also, in 
the field of catastrophes, provide effective incentives for disaster risk 
reduction. This has been well documented. Kunreuther and his colleagues at 
the Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center have argued
that insurance can be structured to improve the incentive to protect oneself 
against flood and hurricane damage. To achieve this goal, they proposed the 
idea of multi-year insurance contracts with risk-based premiums that could 
enable insurers to offer lower premiums for properties where measures have 
been taken to reduce risk.35 As for climate-related extremes, Telesetsky has 
                                                                                                                          
32 See generally Shauhin Talesh, Legal Intermediaries: How Insurance 
Companies Construct the Meaning of Compliance with Anti-Discrimination
Laws, 37 U. DENVER L. & POL’Y 209 (2015).
33 Aviva Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN.
INS. L.J. 345, 348-49 (2009).
34 See generally Marcos Antonio Mendoza, Reinsurance as 
Governance: Governmental Risk Management Pools as a Study in the 
Governance Role Played by Reinsurance Institutions, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 53
(2014).
35 See generally Howard Kunreuther, The Role of Insurance in 
Reducing Losses from Extreme Events: The Need for Public-Private 
Partnerships, 40 THE GENEVA PAPERS 741 (2015); Howard Kunreuther &
Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Managing Catastrophic Risks through Redesigned 
Insurance: Challenges and Opportunities, in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE,
1-40 (G. Dionne. ed. 2012); Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Insuring 
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posited that third-party insurance that follows the polluter that pays 
principle could compel timely climate change mitigation on the part of 
major greenhouse gas emitters. 36 Telesetsky has also explored how 
mandatory climate change catastrophe insurance can serve the goals of both 
corrective and distributive justice. Furthermore, Faure and Bruggeman, 
from the perspective of compensation, have documented how first-party 
insurance can constitute a viable alternative to government compensation 
while victims can also benefit from preventative incentives.37
Empirical evidence supports this literature. An empirical study of 
catastrophe insurance markets in Germany and the U.S. utilizing field 
survey data, suggests the opposite of a moral hazard effect.38 This study 
responds to the theoretical hypothesis that recognizes that insurers have the 
capacity and means to manage moral hazard.39 The findings from Germany 
conclude that “individuals with flood insurance are more likely to have 
undertaken one of the suggested flood coping measures than uninsured 
households”.40 This conclusion is supported by the evidence from the U.S., 
                                                                                                                          
Against Catastrophes, in THE KNOWN, THE UNKNOWN AND THE 
UNKNOWABLE IN FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT, 210–238 (F. X. 
Diebold, N. Doherty and R. Herring, eds., 2010).
36 See generally Anastasia Telesetsky, Insurance as a Mitigation 
Mechanism: Managing International Greenhouse Gas Emissions through 
Nationwide Mandatory Climate Change Catastrophe Insurance, 27 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 691 (2010).
37 See generally Michael G. Faure, Insurability of Damage Caused by 
Climate Change: A Commentary, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1875 (2007); Michael 
Faure & Véronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-Party 
Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2008).
38 See generally Paul Hudson et al., Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster 
Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United 
States, 93 LAND ECON. 179, 179-208 (2017) (They conducted a 
comprehensive empirical study of risk selection in natural disaster 
insurance markets and asked whether disaster preparedness activities differ 
when people have natural disaster coverage. The statistical analyses are 
based on survey data of individual disaster insurance purchases and risk 
mitigation activities in Germany and the United States).
39 See generally Shavell, supra note 5; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra 
note 4.
40 See Hudson et al., supra note 38, at 181 ("Our analysis found that 
households with flood insurance suffer larger losses than uninsured 
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which shows that households who are more likely to have flood insurance 
and homeowners policies that cover wind damage, engage in more ex ante
property risk reduction behavior on hurricane preparedness. 41 This is 
equally evident in Switzerland where a public monopoly insurance exists 
with mandatory participation that has been shown to incentivize risk 
reduction.42
There is an interesting cooperation between the State and insurers. 
Catastrophe risk may result in significant human and financial losses, and is 
therefore an issue that the State must address. The State reaches out to the 
insurance industry to regulate and absorb some of the catastrophe risk. 
Additionally, the State needs the cooperation of the insurance industry 
because of the low-frequency but high-impact nature of catastrophe risk, 
and the complexity of establishing affordable and sustainable management 
and compensation arrangements.43 Moreover, the State often creates a
regulatory vacuum by refusing to take up contentious questions in which 
activities related to catastrophe risk should be encouraged, permitted, or 
proscribed.44 The insurance industry can address the problems caused by 
catastrophe risk and fill the regulatory vacuum by providing the technical 
apparatus needed for risk reduction and loss compensation.45 In turn the 
State cooperates with the insurance industry for catastrophe losses of which 
the expected damage may exceed amounts that could be insured on normal 
                                                                                                                          
households due to their higher hazard level rather than due to moral hazard, 
which to the best of our knowledge has not been shown before."). 
41 Hudson et al., supra note 38.
42 Paul Raschky et al., Alternative Financing and Insurance Solutions 
for Natural Hazards: A Comparison of Different Risk Transfer Systems in 
Three Countries – Germany, Austria and Switzerland – Affected by the 
August 2005 Floods, RESEARCHGATE, 13-14, 17 (2009); Gebhard 
Kirchgässner, On the Efficiency of a Public Insurance Monopoly: The Case 
of Housing Insurance in Switzerland, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC 
CHOICE 221–226 (Baake P & Bork R eds., 2007).
43 See generally Youbaraj Paudel, A Comparative Study of 
Public—Private Catastrophe Insurance Systems: Lessons from Current 
Practices, 37 THE GENEVA PAPERS 257 (2012).
44 See generally Heimer, supra note 21. 
45 See generally Tom Baker, Insurance in Sociolegal Research, 6 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 433 (2010).
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insurance and reinsurance markets. In that case the State provides 
compensation of an upper layer as a reinsurer of last resort.46 In many legal 
systems there are various mutual dependencies between the state and the 
insurance industry in protecting against natural disasters. On the one hand 
the State depends upon the insurance industry to provide primary cover and 
to provide incentives for disaster risk reduction. Insurers on the other hand 
rely on primary investments by the state in disaster risk reduction (for 
example building dikes and levees) and regulating disaster risk reduction. 
Insurers also depend upon the state as a reinsurer of last resort to provide an 
upper layer of cover.47 Moreover, in some cases reinsurance is provided by 
pools which have a hybrid character as they consist of both reinsurers and 
the government.48 Two interesting questions arise in that respect. The first 
question relates to the precise technical tools used by insurers to provide 
incentives for disaster risk reduction. The second question asks whether the 
government equally plays a role (in interaction with insurers) in providing 
those incentives for disaster risk reduction. Those questions will be the 
subject of the next section.
                                                                                                                          
46 See generally Johanna Hjalmarsson & Mateusz Bek, Legislative and 
Regulatory Methodology and Approach: Developing Catastrophe 
Insurance in China, in INSURANCE LAW IN CHINA (Johanna Hjalmarsson &
Dingjing Huang eds., 2015); Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer et al, Insurance 
against Losses from Natural Disasters in Developing Countries: Evidence, 
Gaps and the Way Forward, 1 J. INTEGRATED DISASTER RISK MGMT. 59
(2011); Véronique Bruggeman, Michael G. Faure and Karine Fiore, The 
Government as Reinsurer of Catastrophe Risks?, 35 THE GENEVA PAPERS 
369–390 (2010).
47 See generally Véronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias 
Heldt, Insurance Against Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of 
Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 185 (2012).
48 See Mendoza, supra note 34.
2018 REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE INSURANCE 201
III REGULATORY TECHNIQUES OF CATASTROPHE 
INSURANCE
As a private regulator, insurance operates stealthily by using 
technical tools to reduce moral hazard.49 As indicated these instruments to 
control moral hazard consist on the one hand of techniques to control the 
behavior of the insured via adapted policy conditions and on the other hand 
in partially exposing the insured to risk. 50 In some of the literature 
previously discussed a further refinement of the regulatory techniques of 
insurance has been made leading to the following taxonomy. 51 These 
technical tools, which almost all insurers use to one degree or another, 
include risk-based pricing, contract design (e.g. limits, deductibles, 
copayments, and exclusions), loss prevention, claim management, and 
refusal to insure. Of course, not all of those technical tools will be used by 
catastrophe insurers to the same extent. However, this taxonomy provides a 
good categorization of the types of technical tools usually employed in 
catastrophe insurance to control moral hazard.
A. RISK-BASED PRICING
Risk-based pricing is considered to be the most basic technique for 
creating incentives to reduce risk. 52 Insurers set premiums to reflect 
underlying risk levels in order to provide individuals incentives to mitigate 
losses. 53 Indeed, insurers often adopt feature ratings 54 and experience 
                                                                                                                          
49 Heimer, supra note 21.
50 Shavell, supra note 5.
51 Baker & Farrish, supra note 26; Baker & Swedloff, supra note 31; 
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 4; Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made 
Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 Rev. L. & Econ. 541 
(2009).
52 Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 4.
53 Peter Molk, Private Versus Public Insurance for Natural Hazards: 
Individual Behavior’s Role in Loss Mitigation, in RISK ANALYSIS OF 
NATURAL HAZARDS 265-277 (Paolo Gardoni et al. eds., 2015).
54 Feature rating means insurers examine the insured's individual risk 
characteristics and adjust premiums accordingly; experience rating means 
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ratings in order to signal premium loss prevention. Charging lower 
premiums to careful policyholders induces them to reduce exposure to 
claims in order to avoid higher premiums in the future.55 For example, 
environmental liability policies reward policyholders with premium 
discounts if they take loss prevention measures, such as replacing fuel tanks 
constructed of corrosion-prone material; by contrast, the premium will be 
raised by ten to twenty percent due to a prior leak of the fuel tank.56
Risk-based pricing is therefore quite a straightforward tool to reduce moral 
hazard. 
In the field of catastrophe insurance, risk-based premiums enable 
insurers to provide discount to residents adopting cost-effective mitigation 
measures, and thus provide a clear signal to those currently residing in 
hazard-prone areas. 57 It also urges homeowners who plan to settle in 
hazard-prone areas to reconsider their choice of location and to reduce their 
vulnerability to catastrophes.58 Such regulation may not work if insurance 
premiums are not risk-based. Furthermore for insurers, risk-based pricing 
not only assures adequate returns to investors, but also helps guarantee 
solvency when catastrophes happen. 59 The relationship with public 
regulation is clear: to the extent that public regulation would prevent 
insurers from charging risk-based premiums this tool aiming at disaster risk 
reduction could not be employed in an optimal manner.
                                                                                                                          
insurers gather information about the insured's loss experience during the 
course of the policy period and use that information either to make 
retroactive pricing adjustments or prospective pricing adjustments for 
future policy periods. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 4 at 206.
55 Baker & Swedloff, supra note 31, at 1419.
56 See Yin, Kunreuther & White, supra note 29.
57 Howard Kunreuther, Professor, Univ. of Pa., Testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Economic Growth, Tax and Capital Access of the House 
Small Business Committee: Oversight of the SBA’s Disaster Assistance 
Program and Examining Changes Proposed by H.R. 3042 – The Disaster 
Loan Fairness Act of 2011, (Feb. 16, 2012), http://smallbusiness.house.gov
/uploadedfiles/kunreuther_testimony.pdf.
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B. CONTRACT DESIGN
Contract design can also be used to regulate risk both directly and 
indirectly, by including such elements as deductibles, copayments, 
coverage amount limits, and exclusions. Deductibles and copayments can 
mitigate moral hazard directly by preventing policyholders from shielding 
themselves entirely from loss.60 This is one of the tools to control moral 
hazard: exposing the insured partially to risk will provide incentives for 
adequate prevention to the insured. If indeed a portion of the risk remains 
with the insured, they will exercise greater vigilance.61 Exclusions can be 
seen as an indirect way to regulate policyholders, as it excludes certain 
types of risk or claims from coverage. For example, intentional harm is 
commonly excluded from liability insurance policies; environmental 
claims, too, are often excluded from general liability insurance (“CGL”)
policies. Deductibles are, moreover, a good technique to remedy adverse 
selection: good risks can signal their lower exposure to risk by choosing a 
higher deductible. 
Furthermore, using the tools of contract design places a lower 
burden of information on insurers than when using risk-based pricing. It 
may also be comparatively efficient in attracting insureds to adopt cheap 
measures of risk mitigation.62 Again, from a regulatory perspective the 
ability of insurers to incentivize disaster risk reduction via an optimal 
contract design may be jeopardized as a result of public regulation (e.g. 
limiting the amount of the deductible).
                                                                                                                          
60 “Deductibles require insureds to pay a fixed amount ‘out of pocket’ 
to cover insured losses before the insurance coverage kicks in to cover 
insured losses thereafter. Copayments typically require insureds to bear 
some fraction of each covered loss claim filed by an insured”. See
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 4 at 209 n.30.; see also Baker & Swedloff,
supra note 31 at 1429-30.
61 Id. at 1420.
62 See generally Ronen Avraham, The Law and Economics of 
Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29 (2012).
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C. LOSS PREVENTION
Providing loss prevention services is an obvious form of regulation, 
because it permits insurers to advise policyholders on how to modify their 
behavior in order to mitigate and avoid losses. 63 In other words, loss 
prevention services can serve as ex ante regulation by insurance. Insurers 
have an advantage over policyholders in identifying the best ways to 
mitigate risk and avoid losses, because they are able to collect more data on 
claims and harms. Insurers, therefore, will eventually benefit from loss 
prevention services because they have to pay for the loss based on the 
policy. Additionally, active engagement in loss prevention will enable 
insurers to identify insureds with lower than average moral hazard and
underwrite “good” risks.
Insurers can promote loss prevention in a variety of ways, all of 
which are potentially applicable to catastrophe insurance.64 Insurers may 
monitor the insureds through loss prevention during the course of the 
insurance relationship;65 they may conduct research and disseminate new 
loss-prevention methods;66 they may cooperate with the State, and promote 
the legislation of loss prevention laws and regulations;67 lastly, insurers 
may establish underwriting procedures that make loss prevention activities 
a precondition to obtaining insurance.68
                                                                                                                          
63 See generally Baker & Swedloff, supra note 31. 
64 George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss 
Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN.
INS. L.J. 305 (1997); Baker & Farrish, supra note 26.
65 For example, in the auto insurance context, insurers monitor the 
insureds’ repair service to mitigate loss. 
66 For example, the homeowners’ insurance industry has its own 
association (The Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety) 
researching and promulgating various ways of making commercial 
properties and homes safer from all sorts of hazards. 
67 For example, insurers attempt to upgrade and enhance the content 
and enforcement of state and local building codes.
68 For example, most insurance policies require the insureds to take all 
reasonable post-accident activities to mitigate losses or else forfeit 
coverage. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, The 
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Hurricane Andrew changed the manner in which insurers use 
prevention loss services in catastrophe insurance. Before that event, 
insurers did not promote loss prevention services because they thought 
these services would prevent them from raising premiums and increasing 
their profits.69 After Hurricane Andrew, the situation has changed, and 
insurers have taken a new approach to loss prevention services as they now 
feel that they have the potential to initiate fundamental behavioral change 
among the insureds. Hurricane Andrew has led insurers to engage with laws 
and regulations, as it was understood that the loss of houses incurred by 
disasters is due largely to lack of enforcement of building codes. 70
Consequently, the Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction (now the 
Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety) was established to 
promote building code inspections and enforcement, and to initiate a Code 
Effectiveness Grading Schedule, which uses the Fire Suppression Rating 
Program as a prototype.71 The insurers’ approach has changed from a 
financial point of view as well, because they have to demand high 
premiums in order to underwrite highly risky activities which will lead 
them to a disadvantaged position in the market.72
Some public-private partnership catastrophe insurance programs 
expand loss prevention services by providing information on the benefits of 
risk mitigation to insureds. The legislation for both the Florida Hurricane 
Catastrophe Fund and the California Earthquake Authority, for example, 
demands of insurers to promote loss prevention services among their 
clienteles.73
                                                                                                                          
Insurer’s Duty to Pay Proceeds, in UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 637 
(4th ed. 2007).
69 See generally Robert Hunter, Insuring Against Natural Disaster, 12
J. OF INS. REG. 467 (1994).
70 See Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses through 
Insurance, 12 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 171 (1996).
71 Id.
72 Telesetsky, supra note 36.
73DWIGHT JAFFEE, Catastrophe Insurance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW, 160–89 (Daniel Schwarcz & 
Peter Siegelman. eds., 2015).
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In the context of climate change, insurers have worked in tandem 
with scientists to identify technical and economic parameters of catastrophe 
risk and develop system-wide technologies of loss prevention. 74 In 
addition, in order to realize the goal of loss prevention, insurers offer low 
premiums for low emissions operators as an incentive to adopt certain 
technologies and gradually reduce their emission.75
D. CLAIM MANAGEMENT
In addition to ex ante regulation, insurers also conduct ex post
regulation through claim management. Generally speaking, policyholders 
often lack control over the cost of a claim, leaving its management in the 
hands of the insurers.76 Different lines of insurers operate different types of 
claim management. Liability insurers, due to their right and duty to defend 
and settle, can directly regulate the litigation process and thus mitigate ex 
post moral hazard. Because of their involvement in claim management and 
litigation, they can further apply such information in pricing, contract 
design, and loss prevention services. In workers’ compensation insurance, 
since the employer bears the actual risk, insurers are only providing claims 
administration services based on their expertise in verifying, quantifying, 
and managing the claims and payments.77
In the case of catastrophe risks, the policyholders’ inability to 
change the possibility of a natural disaster, alongside their ability to 
mitigate disaster losses, make claim management quite necessary to control 
ex post moral hazard. Catastrophe insurers, therefore, may employ an 
adjuster to investigate claimed losses, measure them, and negotiate payouts. 
Then they can review the adjuster’s decisions and provide greater 
uniformity and predictability.
                                                                                                                          
74 Peter A. Stott et. al, Human Contribution to the European Heatwave of 
2003, 432 NATURE 610 (2004), https://www.nature.com/articles/nature03089.
75 See Telesetsky, supra note 36. 
76 Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Defense Lawyers: 
From Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 101, 107 (1997).
77 Ben Sahar & Logue, supra note 4, at 213-14.
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E. REFUSAL TO INSURE
The final technical tool used by insurers to regulate their insured is 
the refusal to insure. A refusal to provide insurance is especially important
when the availability of insurance has been made a precondition to exercise 
a particular activity. There can be an obligation to take out insurance either 
based on regulation (mandatory insurance) or based on contract. An 
example of the latter constitutes homeowners insurance in the U.S. Before 
the mortgage contract is concluded, the mortgagor is required to obtain 
homeowners insurance or to relegate to the mortgagee to acquire such 
insurance.78 In this case, and presuming catastrophe insurance is mandatory 
in hazard-prone areas, the insurers’ refusal to insure may have de facto
control over the insureds, and may induce less risky behavior. A refusal to 
insure is of course more complex in systems, such as in France,79 where the 
purchase of disaster coverage is mandatory, or at least a mandatory 
complement to a voluntary homeowners insurance. In that case insurers are 
often forced by regulation to provide the coverage and refusal to insure is no 
longer an option.
Declining to renew a policy is another form of refusal to insure and
can be equally effective. After the insured has conducted risky activities or 
failed to take mitigation measures, the insurers can cancel, rescind, or refuse 
to renew the existing policy. 80 The threat of non-renewal could push 
homeowners to undertake mitigations.
                                                                                                                          
78 Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural 
Disaster Insurance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM 
HURRICANE KATRINA 175, 197 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006).
79 See infra Part IV, Section C. 
80 Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 4, at 209. 
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IV. REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE INSURANCE: 
EXAMPLES
The regulatory techniques of the insurance industry identified in 
the last section are already put into effect in various countries. This section 
will review specific types of catastrophe insurance in five jurisdictions. We 
first address private flood insurance in the U.K. This was, until recently, 
considered as one of only a handful of successful cases of catastrophe 
insurance in the world. The second case relates to the National Flood 
Insurance Program (“NFIP”) in the U.S., a system which has been seriously
criticized in the literature for providing inadequate incentives for 
prevention. The third system is the Catastrophes Naturelles (“Cat.Nat”)
insurance system in France. This provides an interesting model of a
mandatory add-on for catastrophe risks, complementary to voluntary 
housing insurance. Such a model has been followed by many other 
countries in the world. The fourth system we address is the regulation 
through the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance Scheme (“JER”). This
scheme is remarkable as it is voluntary for policyholders, but mandatory for 
insurers. The fifth example constitutes the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance 
Pool (“TCIP”). This is “considered as a good example of catastrophe risk 
insurance for developing and middle-income countries”.81
As these examples will demonstrate, there is wide variation in the 
nature and extent of regulation through catastrophe insurance across 
different countries. For each country we will first sketch the availability of 
catastrophe insurance and whether there is influence projected through 
public regulation. Subsequent, we will examine to what extent the technical 
tools we discussed in the previous section (risk-based pricing, contract 
design, loss prevention, claim management or refusal to insure) can and are 
used in practice.
                                                                                                                          
81 EUGENE GURENKO ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, EARTHQUAKE 
INSURANCE IN TURKEY: HISTORY OF THE TURKISH CATASTROPHE 
INSURANCE POOL, xiv (2006).
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A. UNITED KINGDOM
In the United Kingdom, natural catastrophe risk coverage is 
included among the basic guarantees in commercial and household policies. 
Many households, for example, are in effect covered against flood damage, 
which is usually included in homeowners’ insurance policies because 
mortgage lenders require that a property have full insurance coverage.82
The flood insurance scheme emerged in 1961. 83 According to a 
gentlemen’s agreement84 that divided the rights and duties between the 
State and the insurance industry, insurers regulate policyholders and 
compensate victims in the case of flood damage, while the State sets rules 
and codes for flood protection, flood warning and land use, and guarantees 
the independence of insurers’ operation.85 The distinguishing feature of the 
U.K.’s catastrophe insurance scheme was that the State did not intervene in 
either direct insurance or reinsurance. This UK model was based on a close 
collaboration between the state and private insurers whereby the private 
insurers agreed to generously provide insurance coverage and the state 
committed to invest in flood protection prevention measures. For a long 
time this UK private flood insurance scheme was considered as a model,
showing how a largely private insurance could work in an efficient and 
sustainable manner.86 However, recent large floods have fundamentally 
challenged these mechanisms as it was held (by insurers and by the public 
opinion) that the state did not sufficiently invest in flood protection 
                                                                                                                          
82 Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Catastrophe Economics: The National 
Flood Insurance Program, 24 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 165, 183 (2010).
83 Michael Huber, Insurability and Regulatory Reform: Is the English 
Flood Insurance Regime Able to Adopts to Climate Change?, 29 GENEVA 
PAPER ON RISK AND INS. ISSUES AND PRAC. 169, 172 (2004).
84 According to a gentlemen’s agreement between the British 
government and private insurers, the insurers undertook to offer flood 
coverage to owners of houses and organizations. See Michael Huber, 
Reforming the UK Flood Insurance Regime: The Breakdown of a 
Gentlemen's Agreement, in 18 CARR DISCUSSION PAPERS 1, 4 (Centre for 
Analysis of Risk and Regulation, 2014).
85 Huber, supra note 83, at 172.
86 Id. at 174-75.
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measures and therefore was not meeting its part of the deal. These recent 
developments fundamentally challenged the stability of the system as 
insurers have even threatened cancelling the gentlemen’s agreement.87
In 2013, the State and the insurance industry agreed to a
Memorandum of Understanding known as Flood Re.88 Flood Re, finds its 
basis in the U.K. Government Water Act of 2014. Flood Re, a not-for-profit 
reinsurance fund owned and managed by private insurers, is designed to 
ensure regulation by flood insurance and keep it widely available and 
affordable. It is estimated that 300,000–500,000 high flood-risk households 
would struggle to obtain affordable flood insurance without Flood Re.89
The Water Act of 2014 was launched on April 4, 2016. It contains detailed 
provisions related to the structure and working of the flood insurance 
scheme. Primary insurers sell a homeowners’ insurance policy with flood 
coverage to households in the usual way and then pass the flood risk to 
Flood Re, which pays the insurers if flood claims are made.90 The scheme 
ensures regulation by flood insurance because the claim still rests with the 
primary insurers, but are backed up by Flood Re. The Flood Re fund has 
two sources of income: one is the flood element premium of the home 
insurance policies, and the other is an additional levy on the insurance 
industry.91 However, in an extreme situation—for example, a year with 
                                                                                                                          
87 Hjalmarsson & Bek, supra note 46, at 197. 
88 The Flood Re model is loosely based on Pool Re, a reinsurance 
scheme for terrorism risks formed in 1993 in response to the threat posed by 
the Irish Republican Army and other terrorist activity. See id.
89 The Future of Flood Insurance: What Happens Next?, ASSOCIATION 
OF BRITISH INSURERS (2015), https://www.abi.org.uk/Insurance-and-
savings/Topics-and-issues/Flooding/Government-and-insurance-industry-f
lood-agreement/The-future-of-flood-insurance.
90 Flood Re Explained, ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH INSURERS (2015),
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91 Government and Insurance Industry Flood Agreement (Statement of 
Principles), ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH INSURERS (2014),
https://www.abi.org.uk/Insurance-and-savings/Topics-and-issues/Flooding
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damage figures six times worse than 2007—the government will take 
primary responsibility, and work with both the insurers and Flood Re.92
Risk-Based Pricing. Initially, the premiums were undifferentiated 
across all households, and yet, as time went by, insurers improved their 
knowledge through accurate flood maps and took the real risks into account. 
This is important since premiums of flood insurance are risk-based, not flat, 
and are set on a case-by-case basis. 93 In 2001, for example, heavy 
premiums were required for properties where flood claims had been 
previously made.94 Furthermore, for households located in flood-prone 
areas, premiums have increased significantly during the last few years.95
Insurers in the U.K. can, and prefer to, conduct risk-based pricing 
of flood insurance, because; 1) the State lacks control over the rate-setting 
as per the gentlemen’s agreement;96 2) it helps control moral hazard, and 
“bad” risks are sorted out more rigorously; and, 3) it may provide incentives 
to policyholders to mitigate flood risks.97 Flood Re is also criticized since 
high risk houses will de facto be subsidized through a levy which will have 
to be paid by all domestic property owners.98
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93 Michael Huber & Tola Amodu, United Kingdom, in FINANCIAL 
COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL APPROACH 261, 291 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006).
94 David Crichton, UK and Global Insurance Responses to Flood 
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95 See Jessica E. Lamond et al., Accessibility of Flood Risk Insurance in 
the U.K.: Confusion, Competition and Complacency, 12 J. OF RISK RES.
825 (2009).
96 But the insurers also “agreed that the additional premium rate would 
not exceed 0.5 percent on the sum insured”. See Crichton, supra note 94, at 
127. What is more, according to the agreement between insurers and the 
government to develop the nonprofit company Flood Re, insurers will 
charge high-risk household a premium that will be capped depending on the 
property’s Council Tax band. See ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH INSURERS,
supra note 90.
97 Swenja Surminski, The Role of Flood Insurance in Reducing Direct 
Risk (2015), reprinted in FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF CONSUMER FLOOD INS.
IN THE UK 15-25 (Johanna Hjalmarsson ed., 2015). 
98  James Davey, Flood Re: Risk Classification and Distortion of the 
Market (2015), reprinted in FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF CONSUMER FLOOD 
INS. IN THE UK 20, 26 (Johanna Hjalmarsson ed., 2015). 
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Contract Design. Deductibles are applied to some or all
indemnification, depending on the type of damage and its cause. This 
follows the model provided by building insurance and content insurance, 
which cover not just ordinary perils like fire, but also earthquakes, floods 
and other catastrophe risks.99 Individual policy deductibles per 105 IV is 
1% (between 78 and 156 on average, but could reach up to 2,333).100
Exclusions are also utilized in Flood Re, as homes built after January 1,
2009, will not be covered if they would be constructed in known high 
flood-risk areas (as applied under the old Flood Insurance Statement of 
Principles). 101 Such an arrangement offers real-estate developers the 
incentives to avoid construction in known high flood-risk areas.
Loss Prevention. Insurers promote loss prevention in a variety of 
ways. First, insurers actively engage with government regulation. In 2007, 
the Association of British Insurers (“ABI”) demanded more government 
involvement in flood risk reduction, the approval of new compulsory 
building codes, and the development of long-term (twenty-five years) 
preventive strategy plans.102 Recently, the State has created the Planning 
Policy Statement (“PPS”) 25 in collaboration with insurers, which 
proscribes land-use planning and flood damage reduction.103 Additionally,
insurers conduct catastrophe risk research. At least twelve major insurers 
invest substantial sums in research aimed at producing more accurate flood 
maps. Although such research is expensive, these maps, which are better 
than the UK government or its agencies have been able to afford so far, will 
assist insurers to underwrite, and lead to more accurate pricing.104
                                                                                                                          
99 WORLD FORUM OF CATASTROPHE PROGRAMMES, NATURAL 
CATASTROPHES INSURANCE COVER: A DIVERSITY OF SYSTEMS (2008).
100 The amounts for Individual policy deductibles per 105 IV and 
Premium levels are assessed on the basis of maximum damage (i.e., in case 
a house is completely destroyed). See Paudel, supra note 43, at 264.
101 See ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH INSURERS, supra note 89.
102 Summer Floods 2007: Learning the Lessons, ASSOCIATION OF 
BRITISH INSURERS, Nov. 2007, at 6.
103 Huber, supra note 83, at 173.
104 Crichton, supra note 94, at 122.
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Claim Management. Under the private insurance scheme, claims 
are made via the insurance company, and are established in the individual 
insurance contract. Because data gathering is focused on claim histories, 
and experience rating is applied in risk-based pricing, claim management 
helps control moral hazard.
Refusal to Insure. Individuals and organizations have a de facto
obligation to buy flood coverage if they would like to secure a mortgage, 
because all homeowners wishing to secure a mortgage must purchase flood 
insurance.105 If the properties lack insurance coverage, they may decrease 
in value to the point where they are no longer marketable. 106 Such
quasi-mandatory arrangement makes the insureds take more than normal 
precautions. Therefore, insurers’ refusal to insure will all but control the 
insureds’ activities, and thus they can use this power to induce less risky 
behavior. As mentioned above, a consequence of the gentlemen’s 
agreement is that private insurers in principle undertake to offer flood 
coverage to owners of houses and organizations.107 That, however, does not 
imply an unconditional commitment to provide cover for any risk. 
Furthermore, insurers may refuse to renew flood policies, and 
negotiate with the government to undertake stronger protection measures. 
Indeed, ABI once warned the government to take firmer action on flood 
defense; otherwise the insurance industry would not be able to provide 
flood coverage. 108 This conflict between the government and the UK 
insurers has come to a head in recent years. Many floods occurred, and 
many claims were made on the insurers. The latter claimed that the large 
losses due to the floods were related to the lacking investments by the 
government in flood prevention. Insurers therefore held that the UK 
government did not comply with its obligations under the gentlemen’s 
agreement (to invest in public facilities aiming at flood prevention). Due to 
this, insurers therefore desired to cancel the gentlemen’s agreement. If 
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insurers are entitled to withdraw from the market, the problems of 
catastrophe risk will eventually be left for the State and society to resolve.
B. THE UNITED STATES
The United States is often seen as an insurance-based society, 
whereby there are strong interdependencies between the government and 
the insurance industry. 109 This government involvement can also be 
observed in the coverage of catastrophe risk. In that respect, three distinct 
models of collaboration between the government and the insurance sector 
can be distinguished.110 In a first model, private insurers are the principal 
guarantors against risk, and the government has only limited involvement. 
The Price-Anderson Act, concerning nuclear facilities, is an example of this 
model. 111 Under this model, the Price-Anderson Act mandated the 
purchase of insurance but since 1975 there is no longer government 
involvement in the compensation. A first layer is paid by the liability 
insurer of the operator where the accident occurred; the second layer is 
provided through a collective payment by all nuclear operators active in the 
market through retroactive premiums collected by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (“NRC”). The NRC manages the collection of the 
retrospective premiums, but the financial risk is born by the nuclear 
operators.112 In a second model, insurers provide the primary coverage for 
the risk while the State supplies the reinsurance coverage. The Federal 
                                                                                                                          
109 Baker & Farrish, supra note 26, at 292.
110 See generally Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, United States, 
in Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophe: A Comparative 
Legal Approach 324 (M. Faure & T. Hartlief eds. 2006).
111 See 42 U.S.C. 2210 (1988 & Supp. 1992). “Today, the individual 
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Michael Faure, Compensating Nuclear Damage in China, 11 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 781, 813(2012).
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Damage: A Comparative Economic Analysis of the U.S. and International 
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Terrorism Risk Program illustrates this model. 113 In the third model, 
insurers do not assume risks, but only administer policy coverage for 
government agencies. Earthquake insurance in California (“California 
Earthquake Agency”) 114 and the National Flood Insurance Program 
(“NFIP”) follow this model.115 This section will focus on the third model of 
natural catastrophe risks.
The United States is vulnerable to numerous types of natural 
catastrophes, and the risk of loss is increasing significantly.116 Standard 
homeowners and commercial insurance policies normally cover 
non-catastrophe damage, such as fire, wind, hail, and lightning; however, 
flood damage resulting from rising water and earthquakes (in California) is 
normally explicitly excluded from coverage.117 Flood insurance was first 
offered by private insurers in the late 1890s, yet the financial loss was too 
large for insurers, and they left the market.118The NFIP, administrated by 
                                                                                                                          
113 See Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 47 at 230-231.
114 The California Earthquake Authority (CEA) is a state-run privately 
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the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”), was established 
according to the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, in order to assume 
the flood risk and offer coverage.119 The Standard Flood Insurance Policy 
of the NFIP covers direct physical losses to structures and their contents 
caused by flood.120 The NFIP has sold more than 5.2 million policies in 
22,000 communities over the past 40 years, and provided almost $1.3 
trillion in coverage. 121 Most of these policies are for single-family, 
residential properties—such as those found in Florida—which comprise 
nearly 40% of the NFIP (in number of policies, premiums and coverage).122
However, due to homeowners’ underestimation of the likelihood of flood 
damages, the penetration rate of flood insurance is not very high. For 
example, only 20% of those who suffered damage from Hurricane Sandy 
had purchased NFIP policies.123
FEMA, in administrating the NFIP, works in conjunction with 
private insurance companies through the Write Your Own (“WYO”)
program, which allows private insurers to issue policies in their own name, 
to adjust flood claims, and to defend, settle or pay all claims arising from 
the flood policies.124 Moreover, there is no reinsurance arrangement in the 
NFIP, and if claims exceed its financial capacity, the federal government 
provides a bailout. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, the NFIP required 
a bailout from the U.S. Treasury of close to $20 billion.125 Through these 
cooperative efforts by the insurance industry and the government—where 
                                                                                                                          
119 But some private insurers still offer excess flood protection that 
provides higher limits of coverage than the NFIP. See Well, B. Excess 
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369-397 (2010).  
123 Christopher C. French, Insuring Floods: The Most Common and 
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124 Véronique Bruggeman, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS:
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Bratis, supra note 110.
125 JAFFEE, supra note 73.
2018 REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE INSURANCE 217
private insurers make use of their marketing channels, risk management 
expertise, and existing policy base, and the federal government works as the 
ultimate risk taker—the NFIP enables homeowners to purchase flood 
insurance.
Risk-Based Pricing. Premium setting in the NFIP is partially 
risk-based. At the very beginning, the NFIP tried to adopt risk-based 
premiums that differ per flood zone, but this proved to be difficult in 
practice. Because the owners of buildings built before the creation of the 
NFIP are reluctant to purchase policies providing higher coverage (and of 
course having higher premiums), premiums are determined by applying the 
Actuarial Rate Formula. The NFIP’s overall pricing strategy, however, 
leads to important divergences from the true risk for a number of residents 
covered by the program.126 In 2012, the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance 
Reform Act allowed insurers to eliminate certain premium subsidies and 
increase the risk-based pricing. However, in 2014, this was prohibited by 
the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act, which restored 
grandfathering and limited certain rate increases.
According to the calculation of Michel-Kerjan et al., around a 
quarter of the total NFIP policies are subsidized today. 127 Subsidized 
premiums obviously do not reflect the accurate flood risk and represent on 
average only 35%–50% of the actual risk. 128 Moreover, subsidized 
structures are generally more prone to flooding, and are thus riskier than 
other risk-based premiums structures.129
Contract Design. The NFIP provides deductibles, ranging between 
$500 and $5000. Although a higher deductible lowers the premium and 
encourages more mitigation measures, “97 percent of NFIP policy-holders 
                                                                                                                          
126 See Michel-Kerjan, Czajkowski & Kunreuther, supra note 116.
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choose deductible levels of $1000 or less”.130 The NFIP also uses coverage 
limits. For example, a single-family dwelling is normally eligible for up to 
$250,000 in building coverage and up to $100,000 in personal property 
coverage.131
Loss Prevention. The National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 
1994 creates mitigation insurance and develops a mitigation assistance 
program for the NFIP. The NFIP integrates risk mitigation and prevention 
measures, and it administers different kinds of mitigation programs. For 
example, the NFIP tries to supply premium discounts to encourage 
mitigation of risk. It operates the Community Rating System (“CRS”), 
which rewards communities that undertake mitigating activities with 
premiums discounts.132
Although the NFIP successfully reduced the vulnerability of new 
buildings to floods, it had less impact on existing buildings and was also not 
able to limit the development of flood-prone areas. 133 The increasing 
federal disaster relief, moreover, may reduce an individual’s incentive to 
prevent loss and contribute to this result.134 There has been substantial 
criticism on the payments made after Katrina arguing that they would 
encourage people to rebuild in vulnerable areas.135 Some hold that the NFIP 
                                                                                                                          
130 Michel-Kerjan & Kousky, supra note 122.
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132 See Hudson et al., supra note 38.
133 Raymond J. Burby, Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of 
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(book review).
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therefore provides incentives for property development in high-risk 
areas.136
Claim Management. The NFIP uses insurers, because of their 
claims handling expertise, to settle claims on its behalf. Yet the NFIP bears 
further responsibility with regards to claim management, as the Flood 
Insurance Reform Act of 2004 stipulates that it should increase and improve 
guidance for policyholders about the flood insurance claims process and
reduce the compensation to properties for which repetitive flood insurance 
claim payments have been made. However, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that because insurers do not assume underwriting risk in the NFIP, the 
claims costs are higher than they would be under a private insurance 
scheme.137
Refusal to Insure. This regulatory tool has little function in the 
NFIP. Since insurers do not assume underwriting risk and receive an 
expense allowance for policies written, they have no incentives to refuse to 
insure. Instead, the NFIP tries every effort to attract individuals to subscribe 
to the flood insurance policy. The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 
mandates that lenders require flood insurance on loans secured by 
properties that are located within high-risk flood areas.138 Moreover, the 
National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 prevents federal agencies 
from granting disaster aid in the Special Flood Hazard Areas (“SFHAs”) to 
communities that had not joined the NFIP.139
                                                                                                                          
136 Justin Pidot, Deconstructing Disaster, 2013 BYU L. REV. 213 
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C. FRANCE
In France, catastrophe risks, such as floods and earthquakes, were 
traditionally excluded from insurance coverage. However, after the 1981 
floods in the Rhone, Saone and Garonne valleys, French legislators created 
the famous Act of July 13, 1982, which establishes the Catastrophes 
Naturelles System (“Cat.Nat”). 140 This system offers a unique 
public-private partnership in regulating catastrophe risks. The division of 
responsibilities between the insurers and the State according to the Cat.Nat 
System compares well to some of the other systems discussed. The insurers 
are responsible for underwriting policies, managing additional premiums, 
adjusting damages, handling claims and paying indemnifications, while the 
State is responsible for reinsurance and cooperating with insurers to create 
prevention and mitigation plans.141 Article 1 of the Act of July 13, 1982 
provides that property insurance policies that cover damage against 
property are automatically and mandatorily insured against the risk of 
natural disaster. 142 Although natural catastrophe disasters are “the 
non-insurable direct material damage,” they must be insured in the Cat.Nat 
System. 143 This mandatory requirement, coupled with its efficient 
enforcement by the French authorities, brings the penetration rate of 
catastrophe insurance to nearly 100%.144 In addition, the State will back 
private insurers via reinsurance by the Caisse Centrale De Reassurance 
(“CCR”) with unlimited State guarantee.145 This enables primary insurers 
                                                                                                                          
140 Act No. 82-600 of 13 July 1982 on the Indemnification of Victims 
of Natural Catastrophes, JORF 14 (1982).
141 See Paudel, supra note 43, at 257-285.
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to underwrite catastrophe insurance policies at affordable prices for 
homeowners.
Risk-Based Pricing. The Cat.Nat System adopts a flat rate rather 
than risk-based premiums. It is the government that fixes the premiums 
corresponding to the guarantee against the effects of natural catastrophes. 
Under the influence of the national solidarity principle, Article 2 of the Act 
of July 13, 1982 stipulates that “this guarantee is financed by an additional 
premium calculated on the basis of a single rate set by Decree for each 
category of insurance policy.” This additional premium for catastrophe 
coverage is decided by the State in the form of a Ministerial Order, and 
applied to each type of basic policies.146 Originally the initial rate was 5.5%
in 1982; it increased to 9% the following year and to 12% in 2000.147 As 
this flat premium does not comply with the principle of risk-based pricing, 
it in principle creates few incentives for policyholders to reduce risk. 
Although the additional premium for the catastrophe coverage has been 
regulated by statutes, there could still be some competition between 
insurers. The competition would then not take place with respect to the 
Cat.Nat cover (as premiums have been regulated) but with respect to the 
basic premium for the housing insurance. Recall that the additional Cat.Nat 
cover (for which an additional fixed premium is asked) is linked as a 
complement to the voluntary housing insurance. If there were still 
competition between insurers as far as the premium for the basic housing 
insurance is concerned, insurers would have incentives for example to 
provide lower premiums to insured who would have invested in disaster 
risk reduction. Competition could thus stimulate investments in 
prevention.148 It is not so clear to what extent this really is the case; 
moreover, even if there were such a competition it is unclear whether there 
                                                                                                                          
146 Id at 64.
147 MICHEL CANNARSA, ET AL., France, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION 
FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 101 
(M. Faure & T. Hartlief eds. 2006).
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would be a reward for lower risks and hence a risk-differentiation. In 2006, 
the French public authorities presented a draft amendment to the 1982 Act, 
trying to abandon the unique extra insurance premium rate.149
Contract Design. There are mandatory and non-index-linked 
deductibles fixed in the Act. Originally, the amount of deductibles differed 
based on the type of risk—residential or commercial—but remained the 
same for all perils (except subsidence, which has a higher specific 
deductible). 150 The Decree of August 10, 1982; September 7, 1983; 
September 19, 1983; and September 5, 2000, all insist on this rule. 
However, in order to control moral hazard and encourage loss prevention 
measures, a sliding scale has been introduced to vary these deductibles 
since January 1, 2001.151 Exclusions are also used in the Cat.Nat System, as 
the Act of July 13, 1982, stipulates that damage or costs indirectly due to the 
disaster event are not covered.152
Loss Prevention. The Cat.Nat System integrates risk mitigation and 
prevention measures. Insurers, moreover, cooperate with the State to 
formulate risk prevention plans and form the Barnier mitigation fund.153
The amount of the deductible also depends on whether a particular 
municipality has adopted a “prevention of risk plan” (plan de prevention 
des risques). This fact should hence incentivize the local population to press 
the municipality to adopt a prevention plan.154 However, recent empirical 
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evidence shows that this system does not provide optimal incentives for 
flood damage reduction. The deductibles’ adjustment policy does not seem 
to provide incentives to communities to adopt a risk prevention plan in 
practice.155
Claim Management. The Insurance Code specifies the legal 
procedure of claim management. After government authorities declare a 
“natural catastrophe” in the official gazette, the insureds must report their 
damage to the insurers within ten days, with all relevant documentation 
including a statement of all direct damage to property (indirect damages are 
excluded), photos, videos etc.156 The timeframe of claim reporting is very 
strict (except when suspended by force majeure), and non-compliance may 
exclude the right to compensation.157 Setting a strict timeframe will press 
the policyholders to act with due care and diligence after the catastrophe, 
and allow insurers to send adjusters as soon as possible. 
Refusal to Insure. Although the premiums are not risk-based, 
insurers may not refuse to underwrite individuals’ catastrophe risk. When 
insurers undertake the higher risk, they can reduce risk by purchasing the 
relatively cheap reinsurance policies from the CCR, the only reinsurer with
an unlimited State guarantee.158
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D. JAPAN
The current Japanese earthquake insurance system is a 
public-private partnership between the government and the insurance 
industry. The system is divided into two different regimes, one for business 
and industry and the other for households.159 Business and industrial risks 
are covered primarily by the private insurance market, while household 
risks are covered by private insurers, but with strong government 
involvement.160
The household earthquake insurance regime is based on the 
Earthquake Insurance Act enacted in 1966, and offers coverage for not only 
earthquake, but also tsunami and volcanic eruption perils.161 Insurers who 
enroll in this scheme can offer direct coverage for earthquake damage as an 
extension of the optional property and casualty insurance policy. 
Individuals may choose to purchase earthquake insurance, yet it is 
mandatory for insurers to supply it. The primary insurers cede 100% of the 
underwritten earthquake insurance exposure to the Japanese Earthquake 
Reinsurance Scheme (“JER”).162 Established by the Japanese government, 
the JER is responsible for reinsurance of household earthquake insurance 
through a state guarantee.163 In other words, the Japanese government 
works as a de facto reinsurer, because after primary insurers pay claims of 
earthquake losses, they will be compensated by the government through the 
JER.164
Because it is not mandatory for homeowners to purchase 
earthquake insurance, its penetration ratio is not very high. For example, the 
                                                                                                                          
159 See generally Michael Faure & Liu Jing, The Tsunami of March 
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1995 earthquake revealed a 9% penetration ratio. However, this figure has 
increased to 23.7% following the 2011 Tohoku earthquake.165
Risk-Based Pricing. According to the Law Concerning Earthquake 
Insurance, earthquake insurance applies risk-based premiums. Japan is 
divided into seven risk zones, and insurers set premiums based on the 
degree of exposure and building types. Earthquake policy premiums
covering industrial risks and other non-household risks, for example, have 
normally been applied on an individual basis, depending on the basic 
estimate for the building structure (five types) and the location according to 
the degree of exposure (seven levels), ranging from 1.1 per thousand 
(minimum risk: class A building, level 1 location) to 18.6 per thousand 
(maximum risk: class E building, level 7 location). 166 Household 
earthquake insurance premiums are also determined in relation to two 
additional factors: the location of the property, and the type of 
construction.167
This system of premium differentiation is sometimes criticized as 
insufficient. For example, the division of zones has been criticized as 
extremely rough and crude, and the significant variation in earthquake risk 
between classes is not sufficiently reflected in the premium rating.168
Besides the earthquake insurance established by the Law 
Concerning Earthquake Insurance, cooperative insurers known as Kyosai 
provide the bulk of household coverage, including earthquake coverage. 
However, premiums provided by Kyosai do not vary by location and are 
less likely to incentivize mitigation measures by policyholders.169
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Contract Design. The JER makes use of deductibles. If the 
premium exceeds $550 per policy, this amount is the deductible. Otherwise,
the deductible is equal to the premium of the policy. A maximum limit is 
also imposed: the total maximum limit for compensation by all insurers and 
government is $55.7 billion per earthquake.170
Loss Prevention. Under the JER regime, more loss prevention is 
conducted by the government than by insurers. This is because the 
government controls large-scale construction and development projects in 
different seismic risk-zones and the coverage and market penetration of 
earthquake insurance is not very high—about 20% before the devastating 
2011 earthquake—so it follows that the insurers have fewer incentives to 
supply loss prevention services.171
Claim Management. Under the JER, claims are made via the 
insurance company, and are established in the individual insurance 
contract.172
Refusal to Insure. Household earthquake insurers may not refuse to 
insure; the insured may choose whether to accept it or not, but the insurers 
must provide it. Furthermore, the primary insurers can cede all risks against 
earthquakes for reinsurance to the JER (Earthquake Reinsurance Treaty 
“A”). The government will assume the ultimate risk. 
For earthquake insurance covering business and industrial risks, 
insurers make exact assessments of the risks, and are very restrictive in 
terms, conditions, and ceilings. However, the supply of earthquake 
insurance is quite sufficient, and policyholders can choose from a large 
variety of options, including private insurers, the Kyosai, and in some cases 
local mutual funds. 173 This regulatory tool, therefore, has limited 
applicability in Japan. 
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E. TURKEY
Turkey is a land plagued with earthquakes, which cause two thirds 
of all natural catastrophe damages.174 An important attempt to address this 
problem is the establishment of the Turkish Compulsory Insurance Pool 
(“TCIP”).175 In 1999, Governmental Decree Law No. 587 on Compulsory 
Earthquake Insurance (“Decree Law”) came into force and gave birth to the 
TCIP. One of the main objectives of the TCIP is to encourage risk reduction 
and to motivate the mitigation practices of households.176 As a market 
insurance mechanism, the TCIP supplies earthquake insurance to 
homeowners, and covers losses caused by earthquakes and 
earthquake-related catastrophes, such as fires, explosions, landslides, and 
tsunamis.177 The Disaster Insurance Law (Law No. 6305), which sets out 
the regulations of the compulsory earthquake insurance system in detail, 
aims to prevent fraudulent claims and to increase the participation rate.178
As of January 2015, the total number of policies issued was 6.8 million, the 
total premiums collected were $380 million, the total paid claims were $80 
million, the total payment capacity was $6 billion, and household 
participation rate stood at 38.9%.179
The TCIP is a public entity, but has no public sector employees. It 
is administered by the TCIP Board of Directors, which consists of seven 
members drawn from government agencies, insurance companies, and the 
universities. The government appoints an insurance or reinsurance 
company as the pool management company to oversee the daily operations 
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of the TCIP.180 Insurance companies conduct all the business tasks of the 
TCIP, including underwriting, claim management, and reinsuring, but they 
do not assume any risk. Moreover, when the payments of claims exceed the
capacity of TCIP, the State provides contingent liquidity support.181
Risk-Based Pricing. The TCIP adopts a differential risk-based 
pricing approach. According to Article 10 of the Decree Law, three factors 
are considered when determining the insurance premiums: location, 
construction type, and gross square area.182 The premiums are divided into 
fifteen tariff rates, according to the Turkey Seismic Zones Map, and into 
three different construction types. 183 Consequently, risk-based pricing 
allows the TCIP to considerably reduce moral hazard and adverse 
selection.184
Contract Design. The TCIP provides a minimum 2% deductible to 
the sum insured in order to avoid “penny claims”.185 The TCIP, moreover, 
applies a maximum limit, and the sum for all construction type is NTL 
110,000.186 In addition, there are exclusions in the TCIP policies. For 
example, earthquake damage is excluded if the building was constructed 
after December 27, 1999, but without any valid construction license.187 The 
TCIP also imposes construction maintenance obligations on the insured in 
the policies, as Article 14 stipulates:
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165.
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The owner who causes or allows the building and each independent 
section thereof to be altered contrary to the related design and in a 
way that will affect the load-bearing system, loses his entitlement 
to compensation in as much as the actual loss arises or increases 
because of such reason.188
Loss Prevention. The TCIP was initiated as a loss prevention 
mechanism. It has played an important role in enhancing and monitoring the 
current National Building Code in Turkey,189 and has also implemented 
revisions in land use planning and other mitigation plans.190 In addition, the 
TCIP pays much attention to education intended to raise public awareness 
to catastrophe risk. For example, the TCIP endeavors to introduce the 
concept of earthquake risk management and insurance in school 
textbooks.191
Claim Management. Homeowners whose houses were damaged as 
a result of earthquakes, and those who have a Compulsory Earthquake 
Insurance Policy, should consult TCIP or the insurance companies, or both, 
within fifteen working days of becoming aware of any damage. 192
Meanwhile, loss adjustment is one of the most critical issues in the whole 
operation of the TCIP system due to its role in managing moral hazard of 
policyholders. The TCIP retains loss adjusters already employed in the 
property insurance companies.193
Refusal to Insure. The TCIP can refuse to insure buildings without 
valid construction license or occupancy permits. It may also cancel the 
policy if the insureds make alterations to the building contrary to legislation 
within the insurance period.194 The refusal or cancellation of coverage 
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provides incentives for homeowners or builders to comply with 
construction codes, because homeowners who want to register any 
real-estate transaction, or open accounts for water and natural gas services, 
must present a valid earthquake insurance policy.195
V. COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION
Controlling moral hazard and providing incentives to mitigate 
losses benefit both policyholders and insurers. Such efforts decrease both 
risk and cost for policyholders, therefore enhancing profits and financial 
solvency for insurers. In the context of climate change, it is especially 
important to integrate incentives to risk mitigation in catastrophe insurance 
and thus promote climate change adaptation. 196 The below table 
summarizes the overview of regulation by catastrophe insurance across the 
five countries that were explored in the previous section.
First, the question will be addressed to what extent the five 
technical tools aiming at disaster risk reduction are to a greater or lesser 
extent employed in the countries examined. Thereby the crucial question 
will also be asked to what extent this is encouraged or restricted as a result 
of public regulation. Second, a brief assessment of the effectiveness of 
disaster risk insurance in the five specific countries will be provided.
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A. THE USE OF TECHNICAL TOOLS
Table 1: Regulation by Catastrophe Insurance Comparative Table
UK US France Japan Turkey
Risk-based 
Pricing
Yes, and 
individualized. 
No longer under 
Flood Re
Partially, ¼ 
policies 
subsidized
No, flat rate Yes, but for 
Kyosai + 
criticized
Yes. 
The TCI pool 
applies and 
the law 
provides the 
context.
Contract 
Design
Yes. 
Deductibles; a 
given limit for 
the whole 
content 
insurance.
Yes. 
Deductibles; 
maximum 
limit.
Yes. 
Deductibles; 
exclusions; a 
given limit for 
the whole 
property 
insurance 
policies.
Yes. 
Deductibles; 
maximum 
limit.
Yes. 
Deductibles; 
maximum 
limit; 
exclusions; 
insureds’ 
obligation.
Loss 
Prevention
Yes. 
Engaging with 
government 
regulation; 
conducting 
catastrophe risk 
research
Yes. 
Mitigation 
assistance 
programs; 
risk-zoning 
and risk maps; 
building code 
regulations. 
NFIP 
promotes 
rebuilding in 
high-risk
areas.
Yes. 
Risk 
prevention 
plan; 
mitigation 
fund.
Minimal. Low 
penetration.
Yes. 
Education, 
implementing 
mitigation 
measures. 
Monitoring 
via the 
Building 
Code.
Claim 
Management
Yes. Yes, but costs 
higher than 
private 
insurance 
scheme.
Yes. 
Time limit.
Yes. Yes. 
Time limit.
Refusal to 
Insure
Yes, and it works 
well due to de 
facto obligation 
of homeowners.
No. No. No for 
household 
earthquake 
insurance. 
Others yes.
Yes. 
It works well 
combined 
with 
compulsory 
insurance.
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As Table 1 shows, all technical tools of private regulation are used 
to a greater or lesser extent in the countries examined. However, the 
effectiveness of these technical tools often depends upon the institutional 
setting, in other words on the public regulation. Consider for example the 
first and probably most important tool (notably to stimulate disaster risk 
reduction) being risk-based pricing. In the UK this was allowed and applied 
since the state refrained from intervention in premium setting as a result of 
the gentlemen’s agreement. As indicated, this is no longer true under the 
new Flood Re model. In the United States, however, exactly the opposite is 
the case, where risk-based pricing is prohibited by the Homeowner Flood 
Insurance Affordability Act. As a result of this, the premiums charged are 
substantially less than the actual risk. In France, it is the government that 
sets the premium for the Cat.Nat coverage mandatorily by regulation, which 
excludes risk-based pricing. In Japan, it is again the law that determines the 
system of risk differentiation applied in earthquake insurance, which 
according to some is an ineffective tool to provide proper incentives for 
disaster risk reduction. Finally, in Turkey it is the law on compulsory 
earthquake insurance which created the TCIP that provides the context for 
risk-based pricing.
The same conclusion could be reached for the other technical tools 
that were examined. Generally, one can conclude that the ability of insurers 
to apply technical tools aiming at disaster risk reduction strongly depends 
upon the institutional context. For example, the refusal to insure may not be 
applied in some countries as it is simply prohibited by regulation. In the UK 
the refusal to insure is possible, again under the then existing gentlemen’s 
agreement with the government. But in the US the refusal to insure is 
basically non-existent for the simple reason that it is not the insurers but the 
government that runs the risk under the NFIP. This seems to be the model 
towards which the UK is now heading with Flood Re as well. The same 
conclusion can be reached for France where the Cat.Nat coverage is 
mandatorily included for every individual who purchases (voluntary) 
housing insurance. Exclusion of bad risks is hence impossible as a result of 
the regulation. And the same conclusion can be reached for Japan. Note that 
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in three countries (the US, France and Japan) there is no possibility to refuse 
the insurance and insurers are de facto able to transfer the consequences of 
bad risks to the government as in all three systems it is the government that 
either carries the risk (the US) or generously provides reinsurance (France 
and Japan). In those systems, compensation for hard to insure catastrophes 
is hence provided as a result of the government intervention, but at the same 
time one of the technical tools to stimulate disaster risk reduction by 
individuals (the refusal to insure) cannot be employed. The TCIP in Turkey
is an exception where a refusal to insure is possible.
A conclusion from this brief overview is that the possibilities for 
insurers to actively provide incentives for disaster risk reduction and hence 
play a role as private risk regulators, strongly depends upon the institutional 
context and the nature of public regulation. It is often public regulation 
itself that prohibits the use of particular technical tools (such as premium 
differentiation). Of course, one has to be careful with drawing from this the 
policy conclusion that those interventions of public regulation jeopardize 
the development of technical tools aimed at disaster risk reduction by 
insurers. Of course, it may be the case that in those countries where public 
regulation limits the possibilities for insurers to apply tools aiming at 
disaster risk reduction, that other legal rules aim at reaching the same goal. 
More specifically the government itself could for example (via investments 
in public infrastructure) be very active in developing tools of risk reduction 
(such as improving the dikes or a levee system). The other alternative would 
be that the government imposes a duty on homeowners to invest in disaster 
risk reduction via regulation. If that hypothesis were true, the limitations 
imposed upon insurers by regulation to apply tools aiming at disaster risk 
reduction, would not be that problematic. The government could 
compensate for that weakness via investments in disaster risk reduction (via 
public infrastructure or regulation). However, there is little evidence of this. 
It is known that politicians generally underinvest in disaster precaution
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measures because of limited political pay-offs. 197 There is also 
overwhelming evidence that the government systematically underinvests in 
disaster precaution as a result of this collective action problem198 and 
regulation directed at homeowners forcing them to take specific 
precautionary measures is equally rare; that is why, as was stated in the 
introduction, regulation by insurers is often presented as a remedy to failing 
public regulation.199 However, the above overview of the technical tools 
that would enable insurers to play this role shows that it is often public 
regulation that restricts the possibilities of private insurers to impose 
measures aimed at disaster risk reduction. 
B. COUNTRY COMPARISON
In analyzing the way in which insurance systems described in the 
different countries provide incentives for disaster risk reduction one can 
come to several conclusions.
Until the beginning of this century the UK private flood insurance 
regime was considered a success story. Heavy floods after failing 
investments in flood protection by the government changed this picture.200
Relying on risk-based premiums and other regulatory techniques, flood 
insurers attempted to mitigate and control the moral hazard of households. 
Moreover, “bad risks” were identified and regulated more rigorously, and 
these houses became less marketable due to them lacking insurance 
coverage. In 2013, due in part to political pressure, the UK government and 
the insurers set up Flood Re to guarantee that high flood risk households 
could obtain affordable insurance. Insurers charge policyholders at a 
                                                                                                                          
197 See generally Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: 
The Supply and Demand of Disaster Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101 
(2006).
198 Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Michael Faure, The Economics of 
Disaster Relief, 37 L. & POL'Y 180, 185 (2015).
199 Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 4, at 200. 
200 See Huber & Amodu, supra note 93, at 294. ("If certain risks are no 
longer insurable, but coverage is socially demanded, other solutions have to 
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premium that will be capped depending on the property’s Council Tax 
band, and they will pass into Flood Re those high flood-risk homes.201 With 
this new development the high-risk property owners will receive subsidized 
insurance coverage, paid by all domestic property owners who have 
insurance, thus effectively redistributing from low to high risks.202
The UK system is now effectively more along the line of the NFIP 
in the U.S. That system is subject to much stronger moral hazard, due to its 
partially risk-based premiums and less efficient claim management. It 
implicitly encourages people to live in flood hazard areas and undermines 
the private insurance market.203 It is doubtful whether the NFIP could 
assume the future risk and potential losses because of the large number of 
people living in the flood-prone areas, and the increase in climate-related 
extreme events. It is for that reason that the NFIP has been subject to a lot of 
criticism204 and to proposals for reform. On the one hand it has been 
proposed to reform the NFIP towards a model where premiums charged 
would better reflect risk;205 on the other hand it is argued that the US should 
move to a comprehensive natural disaster insurance regime in line with the 
French Cat.Nat model.206
Although the Cat.Nat System of France adopts a flat rate in 
catastrophe policies in consideration of solidarity, it does provide some 
incentives to mitigation through deductibles, through the municipal loss 
prevention plans (although their effectiveness has recently been 
challenged), and through claims management. More importantly, such a 
mandatory comprehensive catastrophe insurance regime allows insurers to 
play a more active role in regulation of individuals’ behaviors than in 
voluntary regimes. The French model is followed by other countries, such 
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as Belgium, where, since 2005, flooding, earthquakes and other natural 
disasters are mandatorily included in all fire insurance policies.207
Risk-based pricing (except for Kyosai) is undoubtedly a positive 
aspect of the JER and induces policyholders to take mitigation measures. 
However, the insurers’ role is limited because of the low penetration rate 
(20%–25%) of earthquake insurance for households. Given Japan’s 
vulnerability to serious earthquakes, there seems to be a strong argument in 
favor of mandatory earthquake coverage, similar to the French model.
Besides its role in developed countries, catastrophe insurance 
becomes an increasingly important form of regulation beyond the State in 
many developing countries. The application of the above regulatory tools in 
the TCIP affirms Turkey’s image as a good example and a model solution 
for developing and middle-income countries.208
VI EXPANDING THE ROLE OF REGULATION BY 
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE IN CHINA
A. REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE INSURANCE IN CHINA
The current mechanism for managing catastrophe risks in China is 
known as the Whole-Nation System (“Juguotizhi”), which generally refers 
to the government’s efforts to deploy and allocate the whole nation’s 
resources to fulfill a specific and difficult task within a limited timeframe, 
and thus promote the nation’s interest.209 Under the Whole-Nation System, 
the government is committed to restoring social and economic order after a 
disaster. However, such government aid easily causes moral hazard, and 
creates negative incentives to individuals who historically have a strong 
desire to rely on governmental bailout in the wake of a catastrophe. For 
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example, some pure forms of government bailout, including ad hoc direct 
payment and compensation funds, provide insufficient incentives to risk 
prevention and loss mitigation.210
To some extent, more government bailouts may contribute to more 
disaster losses, because people are more likely to rely on the government to 
bail them out than to take precautionary measures.211 According to an 
empirical study on property and causality insurance in five Chinese 
provinces, there is a negative correlation between the amount of 
government relief and residents’ investment in prevention measures, such 
as purchasing insurance.212 Many residents admit that they are exposed to 
catastrophe risks, but they seldom transfer risks through insurance because 
they believe that the government will bail them out when catastrophes 
happen.213
Homeowners insurance is one of the least developed lines in China, 
and its penetration rate is quite low. According to a survey using 
face-to-face interviews, only 4% of interviewees had bought homeowner 
insurance.214 However, the people’s perception of catastrophe risk and 
acceptance of catastrophe insurance presents a more optimistic view. Most 
people would accept catastrophe insurance, while only 4% of respondents 
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considered catastrophe insurance to be unnecessary.215 The remainder of 
this section examines how catastrophe insurance might be used to 
supplement or even supplant the State governance through the 
Whole-Nation System.216 The possibility and feasibility of regulation by 
catastrophe insurance in China will be explored through the examination of 
its regulatory techniques. 
Risk-Based Pricing. According to field research on Willingness to 
Pay (“WTP”), many people are willing to pay more premiums in order to 
acquire full coverage of property loss in catastrophe disasters.217 In setting 
these premiums, regional differences and construction types should be 
taken into account. As was discussed above, the U.K.’s flood insurance 
program has set up a good example of this scheme.
Urban and rural areas should receive different treatments in the 
proposed catastrophe insurance system, because income inequality has 
continued to rise since China’s market-oriented reform.218 Homeowners in 
rural areas are low-income, and many of them could not afford insurance. 
China may learn from the TCIP, in which compulsory insurance for the 
dwellings built in rural areas is not anticipated, and the risk-based pricing is 
only applied on registered dwellings in urban areas. In fact, in the 
earthquake insurance pilot program in Chuxiong, the State decided to pay 
the cost of every rural community’s insurance in order to guarantee 
coverage.219
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Contract Design. According to the field research, respondents who 
have poor house conditions tend to be more aware of earthquakes and have 
a stronger desire for insurance.220 High deductibles may induce people to 
live away from the hazard-prone areas and choose stronger building stlyes.
When setting deductibles of policies, construction structure, house 
conditions, and locations should be important considerations. These tools of 
contract design are a common choice in the five catastrophe insurance 
programs discussed above.
Loss Prevention. According to the field research, 24.1% of 
respondents are not willing to purchase disaster home insurance because 
they know very little about insurance, and do not trust insurers. 221
Education, therefore, should be emphasized in insurers’ loss prevention 
services in order to create public awareness of the benefits of taking 
mitigation measures against catastrophe risks. In addition, if more people 
believe in the importance of insurance in addressing catastrophe risk, 
catastrophe insurance will reach a higher penetration rate, as there is a 
strong positive correlation between the two.222
Claim Management. Insurers in China do not perform loss 
adjustment and claim settlement well. According to the field research, 23% 
of interviewees indicated that they do not trust insurers’ claim management. 
Afraid of getting no payment after disasters, they are not willing to purchase 
catastrophe insurance. 223 Insurers, therefore, should increase their 
transparency and efficiency in order to regain the public’s trust.
Refusal to Insure. Concerted measures and policy are required in 
order for this regulatory technique to play a role in China. China could 
follow the examples of the TCIP. Specifically, the country should consider
requiring homeowners who want to register any real-estate transaction, or 
open accounts for water and natural gas services, to present a valid 
earthquake insurance policy. Further, China should consider adopting the 
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procedures of the NFIP, which stipulates that only through acquiring flood 
insurance for their homes, can homeowners in the 1/100 flood zone get 
home mortgage credits granted or secured by federal bodies or credit 
agencies.
In 1998, the People’s Bank of China (i.e. the Chinese Central Bank) 
issued the Residential Mortgage Regulation, which states that before the 
mortgage contract is concluded, the mortgagor is required to obtain 
household insurance or to relegate this task to the mortgagee (Article 25). 
However, in 2006, the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued a 
notice forbidding banks from stipulating with mandatory effect that 
residential mortgage insurance must be acquired.224Although acquiring 
household insurance is not related to mortgages, loans or other financial 
services, it is still beneficial to review the series regulations and explore the 
feasibility of such concerted measures to be used for the take-up of 
catastrophe insurance.
B. EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE INSURERS
There is little doubt that catastrophe insurers could influence the 
consumers’ behavior. What is less clear is how effective is this influence. 
Theoretically speaking, both insurers and consumers present obstacles that 
may limit the effectiveness of regulation by catastrophe insurance. 
Catastrophe insurers may be reluctant to supply coverage for several 
reasons. First, insufficient catastrophe data impedes insurers’ efforts to 
identify, quantify, and estimate the chances of disasters, and to set 
premiums for catastrophe risks. Second, China’s primary insurance 
industry does not yet have the capacity to deal with catastrophe risks, as 
property insurance companies do not have the capital to fully cover disaster 
losses. Lastly, there are still legal restrictions that contradict catastrophe 
insurers’ role in regulations. 
Consumers, on the other hand, may reject or ignore the insurers’ 
risk management advice, or indeed have little interest in buying catastrophe 
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insurance at all. The Whole-Nation System turns relying on government’s 
compensation into the rational choice. Moreover, due to the low-probability 
nature of catastrophe disasters, and the non-rational behavior of consumers, 
awareness of loss prevention is quite weak.225 As a result, the individual’s 
incentive to buy insurance is diminishing.
This situation is beginning to change. Recently, China began to 
demand the insurance industry complement government actions in 
addressing catastrophe risk. The 2008 Great Sichuan Earthquake and many 
other natural disasters over the following years, such as floods and 
typhoons, made the central government leaders acknowledge the 
contribution of insurance in regulating policyholders and compensating 
victims. In 2013, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee 
promulgated the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China on Some Major Issues concerning Comprehensively 
Deepening the Reform. Chapter III is titled “Accelerating the Improvement 
of the Modern Market System,” and expressly states that “we will establish 
an insurance system for catastrophe risks.” Later on, in 2014, catastrophe 
insurance program trials were launched in Shenzhen, in the Pearl River 
Delta (a densely populated metropolitan area and also one of the world’s 
most disaster-prone regions), 226 and in the Chuxiong region in the 
southwestern province of Yunnan, known to be prone to earthquakes.227
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With the implementation of new practices in the near future, there 
is a growing need to explore the effectiveness of catastrophe insurance. This 
exploration should be carried out by observing and interviewing 
catastrophe insurance personnel (such as insurers, brokers, actuaries, loss 
prevention specialists, and claims professionals), a cross-section of 
consumers through different pilot programs, regulators of catastrophe 
insurance, and other government officials whose work relates to the 
Whole-Nation System. This will be a prodigious undertaking, but it will 
give researchers the opportunity to apply and evaluate regulation by 
catastrophe insurance in China.
VII. CONCLUSION
The starting point for this article was a discussion of recent 
findings in the literature that insurers increasingly act as private risk 
regulators, substituting or complementing public regulation. Our aim was to 
examine which technical tools insurers precisely use to execute this task, 
more particularly in the important domain of the insurance for natural 
disasters such as flooding and earthquakes. We identified five technical 
tools that can be employed by insurers to on the one hand control the moral 
hazard risk and on the other hand provide incentives for disaster risk 
reduction (risk-based pricing, contract design, loss prevention, claims 
management and refusal to insure). In line with the literature claiming that 
insurers act as private regulators, we found that when these technical tools 
are indeed effectively applied insurers can fulfil their task in contributing to 
disaster risk reduction. However, when we then examined the possibilities 
in specific countries (UK, France, US, Japan and Turkey) to apply these 
technical tools we noticed that the possibilities to do so in practice are often 
limited, precisely as a result of public regulation. Public regulation would 
for example prohibit premium differentiation (to promote affordability of 
insurance) or prohibit a refusal to insure (in order to guarantee an equal 
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access to catastrophe insurance for all citizens). As a result of those 
restrictions following from public regulation insurers can in many legal 
systems often not fully play their role as private risk regulators. It would of 
course be too early to simply conclude that therefore the interventions by 
public regulation are necessarily undesirable. However, the interesting 
challenge is to examine whether it is possible to combine the political 
desiderata (for example of providing affordable disaster insurance to all) in 
a model whereby insurers could still apply their technical tools aiming at 
disaster risk reduction.228 That would allow insurers still to play their 
important role as private regulators, thus substituting or complementing 
public regulation aiming at disaster risk reduction. 
Our contribution mostly focused on the question of how the tools to 
control moral hazard in catastrophe insurance are implemented in five 
countries. Another equally interesting question is also why the countries we 
examined show such a variance in the implementation of tools to control 
moral hazard. Analyzing that question went beyond the scope of this paper 
but could undoubtedly be an interesting point for further research.
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